Proper Functions are Proximal Functions (with Harriet Fagerberg)

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Forthcoming

This paper argues that proper functions are proximal functions. In other words, it rejects the notion that there are distal biological functions – strictly speaking, distal functions are not functions at all, but simply beneficial effects normally associated with a trait performing its function. Once we rule out distal functions, two further positions become available: dysfunctions are simply failures of proper function, and pathological conditions are dysfunctions. Although elegant and seemingly intuitive, this simple view has had surprisingly little uptake in the literature. Indeed, our position departs from that of almost every theorist who has engaged with the issue at any depth. We start by presenting three arguments for the position that proper functions are proximal: one from the specificity of functions, one from their relation to intervention, and one from their relation to pathology. We then consider two case studies evidencing the trouble that accepting distal functions causes for philosophical reflection on the nature of pathological conditions. Finally, we anticipate and respond to three objections: that there can be failure of function without dysfunction; that our account is unacceptably revisionary in respect of normal function-talk; and that our thesis over-generalises from a narrow set of cases.

Functions and Populations: Sharpening the Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function

Philosophy of Science, Forthcoming

Abstract: The generalized selected effects theory of function (GSE) holds that a trait’s proper function is an activity that historically caused its differential persistence or differential reproduction within a population, construed as a collection of individuals that impact each other’s persistence or reproduction chances. Several critics have taken aim at GSE on the grounds that its appeal to populations is either unfit for purpose or arbitrary. Here I revise GSE by articulating a notion of population that is fit to purpose and showing that its selection is not arbitrary but flows from the realist commitments of the selected effects theory itself.

Madness-as-Strategy as an Alternative to Psychiatry’s Dysfunction-Centered Model

Book Chapter, Theoretical Alternatives to the Psychiatric Model of Mental Disorder Labeling: Contemporary Frameworks, Taxonomies, and Models (Ethics International Press, forthcoming)

Abstract: A broad base of agreement among the contributors to this volume is that there is a distinctive paradigm called “psychiatry's medical model,” “medical psychiatry,” or “the medical view of psychiatry.” Because of a complex array of institutional, economic, social, and political factors, this model has become so deeply entrenched in our collective thinking about madness that it can be hard to see a way out of it. In the following, I present, on the basis of extensive historical research, one particular alternative. I call it madness-as-strategy and oppose it to the now-dominant view, which I call madness-as-dysfunction. My goal here is to clarify the meaning of madness-as-strategy, to show how it surfaces repeatedly throughout the history of madness in different forms and guises, to gesture toward some contemporary research projects that exemplify this framework, and to describe its continuing relevance.

Madness and Idiocy: Rethinking a Basic Problem in Philosophy of Psychiatry

and

Lack, Perversion, Shame: Response to Commentaries

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2023

Abstract: A basic question of philosophy of psychiatry is “what is madness (mental illness,mental disorder…)?” Yet contemporary thinkers err by framing the problem as one of defining madness in contrast to sanity. For the Late Modern thinker of madness, the problem was not one of defining madness in contrast to sanity, but in contrast to “idiocy” – the apparent diminution or abolition of one’s reasoning power. This altered reading of the problem has an important consequence. For what distinguishes madness from idiocy is not the failure, absence, or lack of reason, but its presence – albeit in a perverse and mutated form. For the Late Modern theorist, madness was always, by its very nature, infused with reason. This “infusion” of madness by reason has two consequences for philosophy of psychiatry today: it revitalizes the project of defining “mental disorder,” and it provides intellectual scaffolding for the emerging movement known as Mad Pride.

This is a Philosophical Case Conference with seven commentaries and my response, “Lack, Perversion, Shame.” Only the target article and my response are available here, not the commentaries, which were written by Wouter Kusters, Sofia Jeppsson, Jon Tsou, Valentina Cardella, Awais Aftab, Richard Gipps, and Konrad Banicki.

Brain Disorders, Dysfunctions, and Natural Selection: Commentary on Jefferson

Philosophical Psychology, 2023

Abstract: I argue that despite the merits of Jefferson’s account of a brain disorder, which are many, the notion of function she deploys is unsuitable to the overall goals of that account. In particular, Jefferson accepts Cummins’ causal role theory of function and dysfunction. As the causal role view, in its standard elaborations, is wedded to human interests, goals, and values, it cannot serve as a value-neutral anchor for her hybrid “harm-dysfunction” account of disorder. I argue that the selected effects theory, or some comparably value-neutral account, would serve her purposes better. [This paper is part of a symposium on Anneli Jefferson’s (2002) book, Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders? (London: Routledge).]

Sex by Design: A New Account of the Animal Sexes (with Maximiliana Jewett Rifkin)

Biology and Philosophy, 2023

Abstract: What is it for an animal to be female, or male? An emerging consensus among philosophers of biology is that sex is grounded in some manner or another on anisogamy, that is, the ability to produce either large gametes (egg) or small gametes (sperm), though the exact nature of this grounding remains contentious. Here we argue for a new conception of this relation. In our view, one’s sex doesn’t depend on the kind of gamete one is capable of making, but on the kind of gamete one is designed to make, where design is understood in terms of an evolutionary or ontogenetic selection process. Specifically, we argue that what it is to be, say, male, is to have a part or process that has the (proximal or distal) biological function of producing sperm. We outline and defend our view, and sketch some implications for scientific and social problems related to sex. 

Function and Teleology

Encyclopedia of Life Sciences, 2023

Abstract: This is a short entry for the Encyclopedia of Life Sciences on Function and Teleology. The final, published version can be found here: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470015902.a0029630 and the homepage of the encyclopedia itself can be found here: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/047001590x

What are Functions Good for?

Australasian Philosophical Review, 2002

Abstract: [Note that this is an invited response to Christie et al., “Are biological traits explained by their ‘selected effect’ functions?,” which appears in the same issue.] Christie et al. argue that the selected effects theory of function (SE) doesn’t do what it’s supposed to do, namely, show how functions can be explanatory. They survey some well-known evolutionary dynamics such as arms races, frequency-dependent fitness, and environmental heterogeneity, some of which have been discussed in the functions literature for decades. They argue that SE only seems to work because SE theorists ignore these dynamics. Their argument fails because they misrepresent what functions are supposed to explain and how they’re supposed to do so. One reason for this failure is that they overlook the role of functions in the broader conversation about teleology in biology, one that has been unfolding for over 2000 years.

Précis and “Response to Critics” for Karen Neander’s A Mark of the Mental

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2022

Abstract: This is a précis of Karen Neander’s book, A Mark of the Mental: In Defense of Informational Teleosemantics (MIT Press, 2017), for a book symposium published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, followed by a response to her critics. The critics are Frances Egan, Angela Mendelovici and David Bourget, and Christopher Hill.

Do Transposable Elements Have Functions of Their Very Own?

Biology & Philosophy, 2022

Abstract: Philosophers who study the problem of biological function often begin their deliberations by reflecting on the functions of parts of animals, or the behavior of animals. Applying theories of biological function to unconventional or borderline cases can help us to better evaluate and refine those theories. This is the case when we consider whether parts of transposable elements (TEs)—bits of “selfish” DNA that move about within a host genome—have functions of their own, that is, whether the parts of TEs have the function of helping the TE move about within the genome. Here I argue that whether or not the parts of TEs have functions depends crucially on whether collections of TEs form “populations,” by which I mean, here, a group of individuals of the same type that impact one another’s chances of persistence or multiplication, by impacting one another’s access to a shared resource. I think there is suggestive, but not conclusive, evidence that some TEs have functions of their own. Considering the problem of TE functionality, then, has value both for philosophy and for biology.

Putting History Back into Mechanisms

British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2023

Abstract: Mechanisms, in the prominent biological sense of the term, are historical entities. That is, whether or not something is a mechanism for something depends on its history. Put differently, while your spontaneously-generated molecule-for-molecule double has a heart, and its heart pumps blood around its body, its heart does not have a mechanism for pumping, since it does not have the right history. My argument for this claim is that mechanisms have proper functions; proper functions are historical entities; so, mechanisms are historical entities, too. This thesis runs against the mainstream new mechanist way of thinking about mechanisms, where mechanisms are generally thought of in an ahistorical way. After arguing for this thesis, I draw out some consequences for philosophy of science and metaphysics.

Ageing and the Goal of Evolution

History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 2021

Abstract: There is a certain metaphor that has enjoyed tremendous longevity in the evolution of ageing literature. According to this metaphor, nature has a certain goal or purpose, the perpetuation of the species, or, alternatively, the reproductive success of the individual. In relation to this goal, the individual organism has a function, job, or task, namely, to breed and, in some species, to raise its brood to maturity. On this picture, those who cannot, or can no longer, reproduce are somehow invisible to, or even dispensable to, the evolutionary process. Here, I argue that the metaphor should be discarded, not on the grounds that it is a metaphor, but on the grounds that this particular metaphor distorts our understanding of the evolution of ageing. One reason the metaphor is problematic is that it frames senescence and death as nature’s verdict on the value of older individuals. Instead, we should explore a different metaphor: the lengthy post-reproductive period in humans and some other animals is not an accident of culture, but designed by nature for the purpose of supporting and guiding younger generations. On this alternate picture, different stages of life have their own evolutionary rationale, their distinctive design features.

Edmond Goblot's (1858-1935) Selected Effects Theory of Function: A Reappraisal

Philosophy of Science, 2021

Abstract: At the beginning of the twentieth century, the French philosopher of science Edmond Goblot wrote three prescient papers on function and teleology. He advanced the remarkable thesis that functions are, as a matter of conceptual analysis, selected effects. He also argued that "selection" must be understood broadly to include both evolutionary natural selection and intelligent design. Here, I do three things. First, I give an overview of Goblot's thought. Second, I identify his core thesis about function. Third, I argue that, despite its ingenuity, Goblot's expansive construal of "function" cannot be right. Still, Goblot deserves (long-overdue) credit for his work.

There Are No Ahistorical Theories of Function

Philosophy of Science, 2020

Abstract: Theories of function are conventionally divided up into historical and ahistorical ones. Proponents of ahistorical theories often cite the ahistoricity of their accounts as a major virtue. Here, I argue that none of the mainstream “ahistorical” accounts are actually ahistorical. All of them embed, implicitly or explicitly, an appeal to history. In Boorse’s goal-contribution account, history is latent in the idea of statistical-typicality. In the propensity theory, history is implicit in the idea of a species’ natural habitat. In the causal role theory, history is required for making sense of dysfunction. I elaborate some consequences for the functions debate.

The Developmental Plasticity Challenge to Wakefield's View

Book Chapter, ​Jerome Wakefield and His Critics (MIT Press, 2021)

Abstract: According to Jerome Wakefield’s influential analysis of “disorder,” part of what makes something a mental disorder is that it stems from an inner dysfunction. A trait is dysfunctional, in turn, when it cannot do what natural selection designed it for. Many of Wakefield’s critics have raised the possibility that there could, in principle, be mental disorders that do not involve inner dysfunctions in this sense. Along these lines, I’m going to argue that some mental disorders might result from “developmental mismatches.” This takes place when the environment that the fetus or child encounters is very different from its adult environment, and the kinds of strategies (physical traits, behaviors or psychological dispositions) that the fetus or child used to master the early environment are maladaptive in the later environment. I argue that this would be a case of disorder without dysfunction, and I give some empirically plausible examples.

Teleosemantics, Selection, and Novel Contents (with David Papineau)

Philosophy of Biology, 2019

Abstract: Mainstream teleosemantics is the view that mental representation should be understood in terms of biological functions, which, in turn, should be understood in terms of selection processes. One of the traditional criticisms of teleosemantics is the problem of novel contents: how can teleosemantics explain our ability to represent properties that are evolutionarily novel? In response, some have argued that by generalizing the notion of a selection process to include phenomena such as operant conditioning, and the neural selection that underlies it, we can resolve this problem. Here, we do four things: we develop this suggestion in a rigorous way through a simple example, we draw on recent neurobiological research to support its empirical plausibility, we defend the move from a host of objections in the literature, and we sketch how the picture can be extended to help us think about more complex “conceptual” representations and not just perceptual ones.

Do Constancy Mechanisms Save Distal Content? A Reply to Schulte

Philosophical Quarterly, 2019

Abstract: In this journal, Schulte (2018) develops a novel solution to the problem of distal content: by virtue of what is a mental representation about a distal object (say, a snake) rather than a more proximal cause of that representation (say, a snake-shaped retinal impression)? Schulte maintains that in order for a (sensory-perceptual) representation to have a distal content, it must be produced by a constancy mechanism, along with two other conditions. I raise three objections to his solution. First, a core component of Schulte’s solution is just a restrictive version of Dretske’s (1986) solution, but Schulte gives no argument for his restriction. Second, his proposed solution to a disjunction problem (his “naturalness” condition) is ad hoc. Finally, his “far-out” version of the distality problem is not a version of the distality problem at all. I conclude that Dretske’s solution is preferable to Schulte’s.

How to be a Function Pluralist

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2018

Abstract: I distinguish two forms of pluralism about biological functions, between-discipline pluralism and within-discipline pluralism. Between-discipline pluralism holds that different theories of function are appropriate for different subdisciplines of biology and psychology (for example, that the selected effects theory of function is appropriate for some branches of evolutionary biology, and the causal role theory is appropriate for disciplines such as molecular biology, neuroscience, or psychology). I provide reasons for rejecting this view. Instead, I recommend within-discipline pluralism, which emphasizes the plurality of function concepts at play within any given subdiscipline of biology and psychology.

A Generalized Selected Effects Theory of Function

Philosophy of Science, 2017

Abstract: I present and defend the generalized selected effects theory (GSE) of function. According to GSE, the function of a trait consists in the activity that contributed to its bearer’s differential reproduction, or differential retention, within a population. Unlike the traditional selected effects (SE) theory, it does not require that the functional trait helped its bearer reproduce; differential retention is enough. Although the core theory has been presented previously, I go significantly beyond those presentations by providing a new argument for GSE and defending it from a recent objection. I also sketch its implications for teleosemantics and philosophy of medicine.

Against Organizational Functions

Philosophy of Science, 2017

Abstract: Over the last 20 years, several philosophers developed a new approach to biological functions, the organizational (or systems-theoretic) approach. This is not a single theory but a family of theories based on the idea that a trait token can acquire a function by virtue of the way it contributes to a complex, organized, system, and thereby to its own continued persistence, as a token. I argue that the organizational approach faces a serious liberality objection. I examine three different ways organizational theorists have tried to avoid that objection and show how they fail.

Mechanisms, Phenomena, and Functions

Book Chapter, ​Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Mechanisms (Routledge, 2017)

It is a platitude in the new mechanism literature that a mechanism is always a mechanism 'for' a phenomenon. Sometimes, however, philosophers describe mechanisms not as having phenomena, but as serving functions. What is the relation between these two ways of speaking? In this handbook chapter, I provide an overview of the different ways that a mechanism can be said to "have" a phenomenon. I also summarize what philosophers have had to say about the relation between mechanisms and functions. I urge that there are at least two different senses of "mechanism." First, there is what Glennan calls the "minimal" sense of mechanism, where mechanisms always have phenomena, but there is no implication that these phenomena are proper functions. Second, there is what I call the "functional sense of mechanism," where mechanisms are always mechanisms for functions. I outline some implications for biomedicine.

Ecological Restoration and Biodiversity Conservation

Book Chapter, ​Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Biodiversity (Routledge, 2017)

This handbook chapter summarizes philosophical problems of ecological restoration. It outlines three main criticisms: first, that ecological restorations are unnatural artifacts; second, that the choice of a historical baseline for an ecological restoration is arbitrary; and third, that there is nothing inherently valuable about trying to make ecosystems resemble the way they were in the past. After outlining these critiques, I offer a positive proposal, which sees historical fidelity as having the same type of value as other conservation goals such as biodiversity and sustainability.

Two Types of Psychological Hedonism

Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2016

Abstract: I develop a distinction between two types of psychological hedonism. Inferential hedonism (or “I-hedonism”) holds that each person only has ultimate desires regarding his or her own hedonic states (pleasure and pain). Reinforcement hedonism (or “R–hedonism”) holds that each person's ultimate desires, whatever their contents are, are differentially reinforced in that person’s cognitive system only by virtue of their association with hedonic states. I’ll argue that accepting R-hedonism and rejecting I-hedonism provides a conciliatory position on the traditional altruism debate, and that it coheres well with the neuroscientist Anthony Dickinson’s theory about the evolutionary function of hedonic states, the “hedonic interface theory.” Finally, I’ll defend R-hedonism from potential objections.

Introduction to Special Section: The Biology of Psychological Altruism (with Armin Schulz)

Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2016

This is an introduction to a collection of papers on the biology of psychological altruism, which Armin Schulz and I co-edited. The collection includes papers by Stephen Stich, Christine Clavien and Michel Chapuisat, Grant Ramsey, Armin Schulz and me.

The Hiddenness of Psychological Symptom Amplification: Some Historical Observations

Book Chapter, Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections and New Perspectives (Routledge, 2016)

This book chapter is a short response to a paper by the psychiatrist Nicholas Kontos, on the phenomenon of psychological symptom amplification (PSA). PSA takes place when patients present symptoms to clinicians that they do not actually have, or, perhaps more commonly, they exaggerate symptoms they do have. Kontos argues that, because of modern medical training, it is very difficult for clinicians to recognize that the patient's presented symptoms are exaggerated or nonexistent. I argue that the hiddenness of PSA is a result of far-reaching instutitional changes that took place in American psychiatry in the 1970s. In short, many psychiatrists went from seeing mental disorders as (unconscious) strategies to seeing them as dysfunctions, nothing more. Recognizing PSA involves adopting a perspective that has been effectively abolished in contemporary American psychiatry.

The Birth of Information in the Brain: Edgar Adrian and the Vacuum Tube

Science in Context, 2015

Abstract: As historian Henning Schmidgen notes, the scientific study of the nervous system would have been “unthinkable” without the industrialization of communication in the 1830s. Historians have investigated extensively the way nerve physiologists have borrowed concepts and tools from the field of communications, particularly regarding the nineteenth-century work of figures like Helmholtz and in the American Cold War Era. The following focuses specifically on the interwar research of the Cambridge physiologist Edgar Douglas Adrian, and on the technology that led to his Nobel-Prize-winning research, the thermionic vacuum tube. Many countries used the vacuum tube during the war for the purpose of amplifying and intercepting coded messages. These events provided a context for Adrian’s evolving understanding of the nerve fiber in the 1920s. In particular, they provide the background for Adrian’s transition around 1926 to describing the nerve impulse in terms of “information,” “messages,” “signals,” or even “codes,” and for translating the basic principles of the nerve, such as the all-or-none principle and adaptation, into such an “informational” context. The following also places Adrian’s research in the broader context of the changing relationship between science and technology, and between physics and physiology, in the first few decades of the twentieth century.

Functions Must be Performed at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations (with Gualtiero Piccinini)

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2014

Abstract: We sketch a novel and improved version of Boorse’s biostatistical theory of functions. Roughly, our theory maintains that (i) functions are non-negligible contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (when a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness); (ii) situations appropriate for the performance of a function are typical situations in which a trait contributes to survival or inclusive fitness; (iii) appropriate rates of functioning are rates that make adequate contributions to survival or inclusive fitness (in situations appropriate for the performance of that function); and (iv) dysfunction is the inability to perform a function at an appropriate rate in appropriate situations. Based on our theory,we sketch solutions to three problems that have afflicted Boorse’s theory of function, namely, Kingma’s ([2010]) problem of the situation-specificity of functions, the problem of multi-functional traits, and the problem of how to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate rates of functioning.

The Functional Sense of Mechanism

Philosophy of Science, 2013

Abstract: This article presents a distinct sense of ‘mechanism’, which I call the functional sense of mechanism. According to this sense, mechanisms serve functions, and this fact places substantive restrictions on the kinds of system activities ‘for which’ there can be a mechanism. On this view, there are no mechanisms for pathology; pathologies result from disrupting mechanisms for functions. Second, on this sense, natural selection is probably not a mechanism for evolution because it does not serve a function. After distinguishing this sense from similar explications of ‘mechanism’, I argue that it is ubiquitous in biology and has valuable epistemic benefits.

Alexander Forbes, Walter Cannon, and Science-Based Literature

Book Chapter, Progress in Brain Research Vol. 205: Literature, Neurology, and Neuroscience: Historical and Literary Connections (Elsevier, 2013)

Abstract: The Harvard physiologists Alexander Forbes (1882-1965) and Walter Bradford Cannon (1871-1945) had an enormous impact on the physiology and neuroscience of the twentieth century. In addition to their voluminous scientific output, they also used literature to reflect on the nature of science itself and its social significance. Forbes wrote a novel, The Radio Gunner, a literary memoir, Quest for a Northern Air Route, and several short stories. Cannon, in addition to several books of popular science, wrote a literary memoir in the last year of his life, The Way of an Investigator. The following will provide a brief overview of the life and work of Forbes and Cannon. It will then discuss the way that Forbes used literature to express his views about the changing role of communications technology in the military, and his evolving view of the nervous system itself as a kind of information-processing device. It will go on to discuss the way that Cannon used literature to articulate the horrors he witnessed on the battlefield, as well as to contribute to the philosophy of science, and in particular, to the logic of scientific discovery. Finally, it will consider the historical and philosophical value of investigation of the literary productions of scientists.

Function, Selection, and Construction in the Brain

Synthese, 2012

A common misunderstanding of the selected effects theory of function is that natural selection operating over an evolutionary time scale is the only function-bestowing process in the natural world. This construal of the selected effects theory conflicts with the existence and ubiquity of neurobiological functions that are evolutionary novel, such as structures underlying reading ability. This conflict has suggested to some that, while the selected effects theory may be relevant to some areas of evolutionary biology, its relevance to neuroscience is marginal. This line of reasoning, however, neglects the fact that synapses, entire neurons, and potentially groups of neurons can undergo a type of selection analogous to natural selection operating over an evolutionary time scale. In the following, I argue that neural selection should be construed, by the selected effect theorist, as a distinct type of function-bestowing process in addition to natural selection. After explicating a generalized selected effects theory of function and distinguishing it from similar attempts to extend the selected effects theory, I do four things. First, I show how it allows one to identify neural selection as a distinct function-bestowing process, in contrast to other forms of neural structure formation such as neural construction. Second, I defend the view from one major criticism, and in so doing I clarify the content of the view. Third, I examine drug addiction to show the potential relevance of neural selection to neuroscientific and psychological research. Finally, I endorse a modest pluralism of function concepts within biology.

Selected Effects and Causal Role Functions in the Brain: The Case for an Etiological Approach to Neuroscience

Biology & Philosophy, 2011

Abstract: Despite the voluminous literature on biological functions produced over the last 40 years, few philosophers have studied the concept of function as it is used in neuroscience. Recently, Craver (forthcoming; also see Craver 2001) defended the causal role theory against the selected effects theory as the most appropriate theory of function for neuroscience. The following argues that though neuroscientists do study causal role functions, the scope of that theory is not as universal as claimed. Despite the strong prima facie superiority of the causal role theory, the selected effects theory (when properly developed) can handle many cases from neuroscience with equal facility. It argues this by presenting a new theory of function that generalizes the notion of a ‘selection process’ to include processes such as neural selection, antibody selection, and some forms of learning—that is, to include structures that have been differentially retained as well as those that have been differentially reproduced. This view, called the generalized selected effects theory of function, will be defended from criticism and distinguished from similar views in the literature.

Schizophrenia and the Dysfunctional Brain

Journal of Cognitive Science, 2010

Abstract: Scientists, philosophers, and even the lay public commonly accept that schizophrenia stems from a biological or internal ‘dysfunction.’ However, this assessment is typically accompanied neither by well-defined criteria for determining that something is dysfunctional nor empirical evidence that schizophrenia satisfies those criteria. In the following, a concept of biological function is developed and applied to a neurobiological model of schizophrenia. It concludes that current evidence does not warrant the claim that schizophrenia stems from a biological dysfunction, and, in fact, that unusual neural structures associated with schizophrenia may have functional or adaptive significance. The fact that current evidence is ambivalent between these two possibilities (dysfunction versus adaptive function) implies that schizophrenia researchers should be much more cautious in using the ‘dysfunction’ label than they currently are. This has implications for both psychiatric treatment as well as public perception of mental disorders.

Function and Teleology

​Book Chapter, Companion to Philosophy of Biology (Blackwell, 2008)

This is a short overview of the biological functions debate in philosophy. While it was fairly comprehensive when it was written, my short book ​A Critical Overview of Biological Functions has largely supplanted it as a definitive and up-to-date overview of the debate, both because the book takes into account new developments since then, and because the length of the book allowed me to go into substantially more detail about existing views.

The Introduction of Information into Neurobiology

Philosophy of Science, 2003

Abstract: The first use of the term ‘‘information’’ to describe the content of nervous impulse occurs in Edgar Adrian’s The Basis of Sensation (1928). What concept of information does Adrian appeal to, and how can it be situated in relation to contemporary philosophical accounts of the notion of information in biology? The answer requires an explication of Adrian’s use and an evaluation of its situation in relation to contemporary accounts of semantic information. I suggest that Adrian’s concept of information can be to derive a concept of arbitrariness or semioticity in representation. This in turn provides one way of resolving some of the challenges that confront recent attempts in the philosophy of biology to restrict the notion of information to those causal connections that can in some sense be referred to as arbitrary or semiotic.